I n response to the 2014/15 Ebola virus disease (EVD) epidemic, both the World Health Organization and the United States Centers for Disease Control advised direct disposal of Ebola-contaminated liquid waste into sewage systems (wastewater collection and treatment systems) and latrines without disinfection. 1 This recommendation was made due to the presumed short survival of the enveloped Ebola virus in the environment, expected inactivation and dilution in wastewater systems, and the perceived hazards of additional waste handling and toxic byproduct formation due to chlorine addition. Subsequently, concern was raised regarding appropriate handling of Ebola virus contaminated liquid waste and the potential for secondary (environmental) transmission of the disease. Key unknowns that fueled this uncertainty included the environmental persistence of Ebola virus, efficacy of disinfection approaches against Ebola virus, and potential for exposure to Ebola virus within wastewater infrastructure. Ultimately, studies found that Ebola virus persisted longer than expected in the wastewater environment with an approximate T 90 (time for 90% inactivation) of 2.1 days in sterilized wastewater. 2 While the most recent Ebola virus outbreak has ended, this experience has exposed a critical shortcoming in knowledge and regulation about appropriate handling of wastewater contaminated with highly infectious pathogens, such as Ebola virus, in both resource-rich and resource-poor outbreak settings.
To summarize research conducted on Ebola virus in wastewater with extension to future viral outbreaks, we organized a U.S. National Science Foundation sponsored workshop in May 2016. The goal of this workshop was to summarize current research findings on the behavior of Ebola virus and its surrogates in the environment, and to move toward a consensus on recommendations for outbreak response and research needs. Resulting from this workshop, several key areas of research need for handling highly infectious liquid waste became apparent, including the following:
1. Move toward a Mechanistic Model of Viral Inactivation. Mechanistic, rather than descriptive, models will enable the more rapid extension of observed inactivation behavior to emerging pathogens and exposure scenarios. Historical models of environmental virus inactivation were mostly descriptive, but recent efforts have focused on providing more mechanistic models for inactivation. 3 Specific mechanisms that should be further explored include the role of pH, ammonia, biological activity, temperature, and solids found in wastewater matrices. Furthermore, the impact that viral lipid envelopes have on inactivation mechanisms should be explored due to the fact that many emerging human viruses are enveloped. We note that this task will be challenging when working with Biosafety Level (BSL) 3 and 4 microorganisms, due to the challenges associated with access time and space. For example, there are currently only 13 current or planned BSL4 facilities in the US, and environmental persistence efforts must fit within other priorities, including vaccine development and investigations of the basic biology of BSL4 agents.
2. Better Characterization of Exposure and Transmission Pathways in the Wastewater Environment. Potential exposure pathways for both wastewater workers and the general public to untreated wastewater are poorly characterized. Specific areas of research needs include defining specific exposure scenarios, potential exposure following unintended releases (e.g., combined sewer overflows), and the differential fate of structurally diverse viruses in existing sewage treatment infrastructure. Specific questions regarding the fate of structurally diverse viruses include how structure impacts virus partitioning between wastewater solids, liquid, and air, and how structure impacts viral survival in wastewater and through wastewater treatment processes.
3. Reconsider Surrogate Evaluation of Emerging Pathogens. Historically, surrogates−physiologically similar microorganisms−have been used to study the fate and persistence of pathogens in the environment, e.g. MS2 bacteriophage to model enteric virus fate. A recent review demonstrated that the persistence of enveloped viral pathogens in water can vary from hours to months to achieve 90% inactivation. 4 As highlighted in workshop discussions, it has become apparent that a limited suite of surrogates will be inadequate for a fine-scale, mechanistic understanding of viral persistence and inactivation in the wastewater environment. The variability of viral persistence within enveloped viruses 4 suggests that where possible, it is best practice to use the pathogen of interest. Where direct use of the pathogen is not possible, the use of multiple surrogates is ideal to capture multiple aspects of target pathogen physiology. Furthermore, in the cases where the environmental fate of BSL3 and BSL4 viruses can be studied, experiments should include a surrogate virus in the same samples that contain the pathogenic viruses, so that the experimental results can be directly compared with other studies. We recommend that bacteriophage MS2 be included whenever possible in experiments with BSL3 and BSL4 viruses as this virus has been widely used as a persistence model and would facilitate cross-lab comparison and validation of persistence studies.
4. Appropriate Disinfection Approaches of High-Strength Waste. Infectious virus will be excreted from individuals in high-strength (i.e., high organic content) waste, such as blood, vomit, and feces. Clearly, control of pathogen release at the source (i.e., disinfection) would be desirable to limit potential downstream exposure and public concern; however, hyperchlorination of high organic content wastes insufficiently ensures pathogen inactivation. 5 Evaluation of alternative disinfection methods, such as pH adjustment or heat, as well as a more mechanistic understanding of chlorine action in high strength waste, are necessary. A mechanistic understanding of disinfection will enable the effective extension of disinfection techniques to novel waste streams and pathogens that have not been extensively studied. 5. Communication. A critical shortcoming revealed in the Ebola response was the need for better communication between the wastewater and medical sectors, as well as with the general public. Forthcoming and accurate risk communication will be necessary to build both industry and public trust in infectious waste management. Multiple factors must be addressed, including the public's ability to understand risk, and regionally and socially appropriate risk communication.
The emergence of multiple high consequence viral pathogen outbreaks in recent years (e.g., SARS, Ebola, MERS, Lassa) has highlighted the value of continued investigation into viral pathogen fate and inactivation in the water environment, as well as appropriate wastewater handling and disinfection. Continued investment and attention in this critical research area is necessary to better inform future outbreak response, both minimizing the potential for secondary transmission of high consequence pathogens and public concern. ■ AUTHOR INFORMATION Corresponding Author *Phone: 412-624-9207; e-mail: BibbyKJ@Pitt.edu.
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